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INTRODUCTION

In his pivotal' concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, 2 Justice Kennedy articulated two fundamental

t Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. B.A.
Harvard College; J.D. Stanford Law School. I am grateful for the comments provided by
Elise Boddie, Susan Carle, Darren Hutchinson, Robin Lenhardt, and Wendy Parker. This
article is dedicated to the memory of my father, David Epperson, a lifelong champion of
education.
I. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/washington/03memo-.html.
2. 551 U.S. 701, 782-98 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) [hereinafter Parents
Involved].
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strains of an equality ideal for addressing systemic racial segregation and
inequality in public education: he eloquently underscored the critical
importance of racial integration for educational equity, 3 and reiterated the
4
essential role of the political branches in facilitating this integration. Kennedy
noted the compelling government interest in decreasing the effects of de facto
racial segregation and isolation 5 and recognized the fallacy of a public/private
distinction in defining the constitutional violation of racially segregated
educational environments:
The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution
requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in
schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion
suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must
accept the status quo
6 of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view,
profoundly mistaken.
Further, he called on the more capable political branches to craft legislation
addressing these twenty-first century constitutional violations: "Executive and
legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of
should be permitted to employ them with candor and
policies and procedures,
7
with confidence.",
This language may appear at odds with the actual holding in Parents
Involved, in which a majority of justices struck down two racial integration
policies voluntarily8 adopted by local school boards for not meeting the "strict
scrutiny" requirements of current equal protection jurisprudence. Yet, Justice
Kennedy focuses on the broader constitutional ideal of fostering racial
inclusion in our nation's schools, a focus implicitly endorsed by the four
dissenting justices. While many cast the project of racial integration as a relic
of a bygone era, unsuccessful or inadequate to overcome the complex factors
contributing to twenty-first century social, economic, and educational
inequities, 9 Kennedy highlights the continued0 relevance of racial integration to
the promise of Brown v. Board of Education.'

3. Id. at 787-88.
4. Id. at 789.
5. "A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school
district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue." Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
6. Id. at 788.
7. Id.at 789.
8. 1 use the term "voluntarily" to distinguish integration plans that school boards
adopted by choice from those plans that school boards adopted pursuant to a court order to
eliminate the vestiges of state-mandated segregation.
9.

See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF

APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 240 (2005) (quoting Professor Roger Wilkins that many
Americans feel "morally exhausted" regarding racial integration, although much of this
exhaustion may stem from compulsory or court-orderedschool integration).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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In the twenty-first century, this constitutional ideal survives in key
respects, both in the will of our nation's polity and as a relevant aspect of
educational policy. The voluntary racial integration policies at issue in Parents
Involved, for example, reflect a desire shared by many school districts to
encourage racial diversity in their schools. I I At a time in which this nation is at
a crossroads of educational crisis and political opportunity, this ideal seems
particularly salient. Barely fifty percent of the nation's population is white,
with a rapidly increasing non-white population. Today's schoolchildren will
live and work in a multiracial society with no racial or ethnic majority. 12 Yet,
schools are more segregated than at any point in last forty years. 13 Such rapidly
increasing racial and economic segregation 14 accompanies or contributes to a
hcst of other inequalities, including limited resources and fewer experienced
and credentialed teachers. Such segregation and profound educational
inequality also contribute to a lack of minority participation in higher education
15
and larger racial disparities in employment, even controlling for education.
Conversely, research detailing the benefits of racial and economic diversity and
the harm of racial isolation has been growing steadily since 1990)6 Such
evidence demonstrates that racially diverse schools are associated with math
and reading achievement, critical thinking skills, intellectual engagement, and a
reduction in racial stereotyping.17

11. See infra Part II.B. (discussing empirical evidence cited in Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion in ParentsInvolved).
12. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING

RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 4 (2007).

13. Id. (noting that "[This] country's rapidly growing population of Latino and black
students is more segregated than they have been since the 1960s and we are going backward
faster in the areas where integration was most far-reaching.").
14. Id. at 21 (noting that half of this nation's schools have less than twenty percent
black and Latino students attending them, while another twenty percent of the schools have
at least seventy percent black and Latino students). In addition, "students in intensely
segregated (90-100%) minority schools are more than four times as likely to be in
predominantly poor schools than their peers attending schools with less than ten percent
minority students (84% compared to 18%)." Id. In contrast, of the intensely segregated white
schools (less than 10% black and Latino), about one-fifth (24%) of the students attended
majority poor schools. Id.
15. See id. at 38-40. See also CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, WHO GRADUATES? WHO
DOESN'T? A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION, CLASS OF 2001 29-34
(2004); ROBERT BALFANZ & THOMAS WEST, RACIAL ISOLATION AND HIGH SCHOOL

PROMOTING POWER (2006); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School
DesegregationExplained,90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1625 (1990).
16. CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. FOR RACE & JUSTICE POLICY, DIVERSITY
MATTERS: WHY WE SHOULD CREATE & SUSTAIN DIVERSITY IN SCHOOLS (2009) (citing

research from education, public health, neuroscience, and economics literature), available at
http://charleshamiltonhouston.org/assets/documents/publications/CHHIRJ DiversityMatters
Brief.pdf.
17. Id.
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There is a unique opportunity to bridge the divide between constitutional
ideals and practice in the realm of racial equality in education. A majority of
Supreme Court justices have articulated a vision of constitutional protection
that allows for a more informed and nuanced approach to addressing racial
isolation in schools than in recent history. 18 While this vision outlines existing
avenues in the Supreme Court's current doctrine, it represents a broader
normative view of constitutional solutions for twenty-first century racial
inequities in education.
In previous work, I have examined the intersection of federal judicial and
executive power in delineating the scope and meaning of school integration
jurisprudence.' 9 This article builds on those earlier efforts. Specifically, in light
of existing jurisprudential limitations, I suggest scholars and advocates may
consider congressional solutions to existing structural racial disparities in
education by creating legislative mechanisms to foster racial inclusion in public
education. I argue that Congress may be the appropriate body to bridge the
chasm between the constitutional ideal and practice of racially inclusive
to shaping our
education, to help strengthen those institutions integral
20
democracy and preparing students to be effective citizens.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an analysis of the
jurisprudential shifts in recognizing the right to racially integrated education.
There has been a doctrinal change in the framework for evaluating and
addressing the substantive equality right to racially integrated schools. To
understand the potential role of Congress in remedying or deterring
constitutional violations, we must first understand and be able to identify the
shifting jurisprudential framework for addressing persistent structural racial
inequities. Part II examines the Court's most recent discussion of a modem
substantive equality right to racially integrated education, which more closely
resembles an anti-subordination model of equality. Existing jurisprudential
avenues to address current constitutional violations in this sphere, however, are
limited by an anti-classification framework. Part III discusses the propriety of
congressional action to pursue racial inclusion in public education in the face of
such institutional jurisprudential limitations. Scholars have long discussed the
21
notion that Congress has independent authority to interpret the Constitution.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See Lia Epperson, UndercoverPower: Examining the Role of the Executive Branch
in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School IntegrationJurisprudence,10 BERKELEY J.
OF AFR. AM. L. & POL.'Y 146 (2008).
20. It is clear that racially diverse schools are not a viable choice for all districts due to
demographics. Rather, this Article argues that for those areas in which fostering racial
inclusion is a realistic option for increasing educational opportunities, legislative avenues
may be an underutilized but potentially transformative choice.
21 Departmentalist scholars posit that each of the federal branches of government
possesses coordinate authority to serve as independent constitutional interpreters. See, e.g.,
Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches, 38 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Michael
S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). Dean Larry Kramer has
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Indeed, the populist branch has a rich history of facilitating equality through
legislative measures, particularly in the domain of education. In this Part, I
examine both historic forms of equality legislation at the intersection of race
and education as well as more contemporary statutes that may serve as
interesting models. I argue that institutionally, the "populist branch" has both
the flexibility and expertise to significantly ameliorate racial inequality in
educational opportunity by providing support and structures for localities to
foster racial inclusion.
1. JURISPRUDENTIAL SHIFTS IN RIGHTS RECOGNITION

Since Brown, jurists, scholars, and legal practitioners have offered disputed
definitions of the constitutional violation identified in the opinion and
alternative views on the efficacy of adjudicated constitutional law versus
statutory law in recognizing a robust constitutional requirement to affirmatively
eliminate racial segregation in education. 22 While the opinion clearly outlawed
state-sanctioned racial segregation in education, the remedial ruling in Brown II
allowed school districts to proceed at a sluggish pace in removing firmly
entrenched barriers to educational opportunity for African Americans.23 The
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided some substance to the Brown
directive by linking the receipt of federal funds to desegregation efforts, and
threatening litigation to those districts that refused to comply.24 In addition, a
series of Supreme Court opinions in the late 1960s and early 1970s fleshed out
the Brown directive by imposing an affirmative duty on school districts to
eliminate all vestiges of racially segregated educational systems, and by

highlighted the notion of popular constitutionalism, arguing that the community at large,
rather than the judiciary, controls the meaning of the Constitution and its implementation in
daily governing processes. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). That is, the people have ongoing and

active control over the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law, and no single
federal branch has final authority. Id.; see also Larry Kramer, "The Interest of Man ": James
Madison, Popular Constitutionalism,and the Theory of DeliberativeDemocracy, 41 VAL. U.
L. REV. 697 (2006); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: PolicentricInterpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112)
YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). Reva Siegel and Robert Post, in contrast, would argue that a more
symbiotic and interdependent relationship exists between judicial supremacy and popular
constitutionalism. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,Departmentalism,
andJudicialSupremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004).
22. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (1993); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-71 (1991)
(arguing that power of courts to affect social change is limited to circumstances not present
in the desegregation context); Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of
Education, 90 VA. L. REv. 1693 (2004) (noting the minimal effect of the decision on the
segregated South and the important role of the decision in U.S. politics).
23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c-6 (West 2003).
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recognizing the strong link between educational segregation and residential
segregation.25
Thus, at least for a time, both adjudicated constitutional law and statutory
law recognized a robust constitutional requirement to affirmatively eliminate
racial segregation in education. The laws armed school districts with the
necessary tools to begin the challenging process of reversing deeply entrenched
racial discrimination and inequality, and federal legislation provided both a
carrot and stick.2 6 These efforts resulted in increased racial integration in
to educational opportunity for African
schools and a decrease in many barriers
27

Americans and other racial minorities.
After a period of vigorous adjudicatory and statutory laws promoting racial
integration in schools, courts significantly narrowed the scope of the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection for African Americans in education
and other facets of life. In the education realm, a series of opinions decreased
the burden that school districts must show to be released from court orders
mandating desegregation, regardless of whether evidence suggested the school
district would resegregate as a result of the unitary status order. 28 These
desegregation doctrines marked a significant shift from the deeper
understanding of the constitutional violation articulated in earlier cases, and
they also signaled a jurisprudential reticence to identify and address any racial
inequality not clearly flowing from specific instances of de jure school
segregation. While countless districts remained segregated years after the
Brown ruling, the Court seemed loathe to incorporate into its rulings an
understanding of the historical and social context surrounding persistent racial

25. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (finding
racially segregated schools led to segregated housing, as families lived near the schools that
accepted their children); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). Cf Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).

26. For a more detailed discussion on the role of the Department of Education's Office
for Civil Rights' enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, see Epperson, supra note
19.
27. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD
UNIV., RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION (2006),

available

at

http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k- 12-education/integration-and-

qIiversity/racial-transformation-and-the-changing-nature-of-segregation/orfield-racialtransformation-2006.pdf, James McPartland & JoMills Braddock, Going to College and
Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
EQUITY, QUALITY, AND FEASIBILITY 141 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981); NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF EDUCATION, RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL

SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES (2007), available at
http://www.naeducation.org/Meredith Report.pdf.
28. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248-50 (1991) (holding that a federal court
desegregation order should end once a "unitary" system could be established, even if it
resulted in a resegregation of schools); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995);
Freeman v. Pius, 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992) (holding that a formerly segregated school
district may be declared partially "unitary" and released from federal oversight, so long as
the district meets part of its desegregation order).

Oct. 2011]

EQUALITY DISSONANCE

segregation and inequality in public education. 29 In more recent years, even
those formerly segregated districts who wanted to maintain racially integrative
policies after achieving "unitary status" have been stymied by existing judicial
30
models of redress.
At the same time the Court retreated from addressing pervasive racial
inequities in elementary and secondary education, it issued a number of
opinions marking a retreat from addressing structural, or systemic, racial
inequities in other domains. 31 In public higher education and in contracting, the
Court rejected race-conscious remedies designed to ameliorate "societal
discrimination," which may include more widespread evidence of
discrimination in an industry and/or across the nation. 32 According to the Court,
"societal discrimination" was "an amorphous concept of injury
that may be
ageless in its reach into the past." 33 It did not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation because it failed to identify a specific injury by a clearly identifiable
actor.34 While affirmative action jurisprudence has allowed for some race-

29. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV.,
A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 17

(2003), availableat http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/resegO3/
resegregation03.php (noting that a decade after the Brown ruling, 98 percent of black
students in Southern states attended fully segregated schools); see also Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although the "remedial programs at issue in
Jenkins had been in place for only seven years, the State of Missouri has a long and welldocumented history of racial subjugation, including slavery, slave-era 'compulsory
ignorance' laws forbidding the education of blacks and state-sponsored racial segregation."
Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of EducationalEquity in the
Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITr. L. REV. 175, 186 n.63 (2005) (citing Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 175
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
30. The Jefferson County, Kentucky Board of Education is but one example of a
formerly segregated school district committed to maintaining integrated schools even after
the court declared the district "unitary" and released it from federal judicial oversight.
31. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to race-based federal affirmative action measures); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 639
(1993); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
32. In Regents of University of Californiav. Bakke, the University of California, Davis
School of Medicine unsuccessfully defended its race-conscious admissions policy as a
means to redress "societal discrimination." 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978). In City of Richmond v.
Croson, the Court rejected a race-conscious remedy in contracting in favor of a race-neutral
approach. 488 U.S. 469, 508-510 (1989) (plurality opinion). For the first time, the Court
rejected a race-conscious remedy designed to alleviate "societal discrimination," even after
reviewing detailed findings of racial discrimination in the contracting industry. Id. at 531-36
(Marshall, J. dissenting) (citing congressional findings). See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that "[s]ocietal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy" because a
"court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and
timeless in
their ability to affect the future.").
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
34. For additional analysis of this phenomenon, see Lia Epperson, The Rehnquist
Court, the Resurrection of Plessy, and the Ever-Expanding Definition of "Societal
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conscious policies in higher education, 35 the Court failed to recognize a
constitutional duty to eliminate the various forms of structural racial inequality
that cannot be easily cabined into the traditional definitions of state-mandated
racial discrimination and segregation that existed at the time of Brown. 36 In its
rulings on the constitutionality of societal discrimination, the Court articulated
a narrower view of constitutional protections, which did not include an
acknowledgement or understanding of the myriad historical, social, spatial,
political, and economic factors contributing to the continued racial inequities in
education or other spheres. Accordingly, adjudicated constitutional law has
limited constitutional remedies to a narrow band of injustices As Justice Powell
expressed in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Constitution
in education, but
requires redress for identifiable state-sponsored discrimination
37
not for the more nebulous forms of societal discrimination.
II. ANTI-SUBORDINATION

IDEALS IN ANTI-CLASSIFICATION JURISPRUDENCE

I suggest that Justice Kennedy's concurrence in ParentsInvolved outlines
an ideal of twenty-first century equality in educational opportunity that more
closely resembles an anti-subordination model of equality than the anticlassification definition that has dominated jurisprudence in recent decades.
While the anti-classification model is rooted in the notion of a "colorblind
constitution" that views with equal skepticism racial classifications aimed at
preserving and perpetuating racial subordination and those aimed at remedying
past discrimination, the anti-subordination definition of the Fourteenth
Amendment is color conscious in nature. Under the anti-subordination
definition, the central purpose of the equal protection clause is to eliminate a
racial caste system 38 by prohibiting policies and official practices "that
aggravate[] or perpetuate[] the subordinate position of a specially
disadvantaged group." 39 Kennedy articulates a constitutional ideal whose aim is
to address persistent structures of racial inequality in education, even when not
directly linked to identifiable state-sponsored discrimination. Ultimately,

Discrimination," in AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE

NEW STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (Denise C. Morgan et al. eds., 2006).
35. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of a raceconscious admissions policy in a public university).

36. See id. at 353.
37. Justice Powell held "[i]n the school cases, the States were required by court order
to redress the wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was
far more focused than the remedying of the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past." 438 U.S. 265,
307 (1978).
38. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REV 2410, 2429.
(1991).

39. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
157(1976).
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however, Kennedy limits his suggested constitutional tools to address such
inequality by steering the final analysis closer to the anti-classification model
that the strict scrutiny framework requires. The institutional limitations of the
judiciary underscore the vital role the legislature may play in facilitating more
workable solutions for the persistent inequality that Kennedy identifies.
A. Twenty-First Century Constitutional Ideal
In his concurrence in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy conveys an
understanding of constitutional requirements for racial equality that is
strikingly different to the rhetoric used in the equality jurisprudence of the last
several years. An examination of such language illuminates potential doctrinal
shifts in equality jurisprudence at the intersection of race and education.
Indeed, the language is also important for the normative constitutional ideal it
articulates. This broader ideal provides a twenty-first century understanding of
the persistent and complex systemic racial inequities in education, which is
implicitly endorsed by four other Justices. 40
Justice Kennedy posits a definition of equality and constitutional duty that
is more realistic and idealistic than his less moderate colleagues or his own
prior jurisprudence. 4 1 He does so by acknowledging the persistence of racial

40. Scholars have noted that the boundary between the Constitution and constitutional
law includes the question of whether constitutional law "subsists[s] in the principles and
reasons advanced in judicial opinions, or .... [is] confined to the specific holdings of judicial
judgments." Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 1040 (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanationsfor Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43
(1993)). With respect to this portion of the Court's equal protection analysis, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence is arguably the controlling opinion given that Parents Involved is a
"fragmented" Supreme Court decision. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977); accord Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007). As the Supreme Court
noted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, "[w]here a Justice or Justices concurring in the
judgment . . . articulates a legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce
results with which a majority of the Court from that case would agree, that standard is the
law of the land." 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (applying Marks). Kennedy garnered the votes of the four dissenting Justices
with respect to identification of a school district's interest in reducing racial isolation. Doe 1
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 689 F. Supp. 2d 742, 750 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
41. In prior jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy exhibited skepticism and disdain for the
use of race-conscious measures for the sake of "racial balancing." See, e.g., Grutter, 539
U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contending that a law school cannot avoid strict
scrutiny by utilizing "the concept of critical mass ... to mask" efforts to achieve "racial
balance"). Similarly, in voting rights rulings, Kennedy repeatedly rejected race-conscious
districting. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) ("When the State
assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption
that voters of a particular race, because of their race" have similar voting interests); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). Kennedy appears to have softened his position with respect to
race-conscious districting in recent jurisprudence. League of United Latin American Citizens
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inequality in education; the compelling government interest in addressing racial
isolation in education, even if it cannot be clearly and easily traced to statesponsored segregation; and the appropriate role of political branches in
developing measures to combat racial isolation in education. Finally, Kennedy
underscores the importance of addressing racial isolation and inequality in the
unique domain of education.
First, Kennedy confirms that "[s]chool districts can seek to reach Brown's
objective of equal educational opportunity. 'A 2 In doing so, Kennedy notes the
futility of race neutrality in the face of the existing racial reality: "The enduring
hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does. ' 43 This
legal-realist language distinguishes Kennedy's understanding of equality
violations from those of his more conservative colleagues, with whom he
ultimately voted to strike down the policies at issue, and from his own prior
equality jurisprudence. In City of Richmond v. Croson, for example, Kennedy
of racial neutrality is the driving
famously wrote that "[t]he moral imperative
' 44
Clause.
Protection
Equal
the
force of
Second, Justice Kennedy finds that "a compelling interest exists in
avoiding racial isolation,"45 regardless of whether that isolation is the direct
result of state-sponsored racial discrimination. Rather, his equal protection
analysis clearly acknowledges the discrepancy between historic instances of de
jure racial segregation in education and its current manifestations, which are
more systemic in nature, but no less pernicious. Unlike prior jurisprudence,
which often disregarded present-day manifestations of racial segregation and
isolation as amorphous societal discrimination for which the Constitution
provides no remedy, Kennedy articulates an understanding of the thorny reality
of persistent racial injustice in the twenty-first century:
From the standpoint of the victim, it is true, an injury stemming from racial
prejudice can hurt as much when the demeaning treatment based on race
identity stems from bias masked deep within the social order as when it is
imposed by law. The distinction between government and private action,
furthermore, can be amorphous both as a historical matter and as a matter of

versa. Neither
present-day finding of fact. Laws arise from a culture and •vice
•• 46
can assign to the other all responsibility for persisting injustices.
Consequently, Kennedy finds that constitutional protections cannot rest on a
hazy public/private distinction. This language contemplates a compelling

v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 (2006) (objecting to the dismantling of a majority-minority
district on the ground that Latinos "had found an efficacious political identity").
42. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (2007).
43. Id. at 787.
44. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
45. 551 U.S. at 798 (italics added).
46. Id. at 795.

Oct. 2011 ]

EQUALITY DISSONANCE

interest in addressing the forms of racial inequality ignored in prior
jurisprudence.
Further, Kennedy notes that the political branches should have the freedom
to explore policies that may address these persistent inequities: "Executive and
legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of
policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and
with confidence. ' ' 7 School districts have unique "expertise,8 and should be
able to devise policies to address racial isolation. Kennedy endorses certain
strategies to put this constitutional ideal into practice. These strategies include
general mechanisms to foster the sort of racial inclusion that Kennedy suggests
is an integral part of our society. 49 Policies include strategic site selection of
new schools, targeted student and faculty recruitment, and drawing attendance
50
zone lines to maximize racial integration.
It is also noteworthy that Kennedy identifies this compelling interest in the
context of elementary and secondary education. In the first sentence of his
concurrence, Kennedy recognized that our "[n]ation's schools strive to teach
that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and cultures
uniting in commitment to the freedom of all.",51 Schools are the institutions that
teach our children democratic ideals and that shape them to be successful and
productive citizens. The Court has long acknowledged the unique role of
elementary and secondary schools in teaching such civic and moral skills to
students, 52 and the role of the government in ensuring that every child receives

47. Id. at 789.
48.

Id.

49. Kennedy underscores the constitutionality of considering racial composition:
In the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it is permissible to
consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse
student body, one aspect of which is its racial composition. (citations omitted). If school

authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools interfere with
the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are
free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without
treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing
by race. School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse

backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.
Id. at 789-90. For a discussion of the viability of these options in facilitating racial inclusion,
see infra Part I.B.
50. For a critique of the efficacy of such methods, see infra Part I.B.
51. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782.
52. See, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (when
the government serves as "educator," it "is engaged in inculcating social values and
knowledge in relatively impressionable young people."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982) (noting "the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the
lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child."). See generally James E.Ryan, The
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an education. 53 Kennedy's language extends the imperative of civic education
to embrace racial inclusion, lamenting that "our highest aspirations are yet
unfulfilled., 54 To meet the constitutional ideal of equality, one must allow for
constitutional solutions to address twenty-first century impediments to equality
in educational opportunity. While the Supreme Court has never identified a
55
fundamental right to education under the Equal Protection Clause, it has
repeatedly recognized public education as an essential foundation of American
society. This importance, according to the Court, stems in large part from the
role public schools play in providing children the knowledge and value base
necessary to uphold our democracy. 56 Kennedy's justification for racially
integrated education is based more on the social capital gained from integrated
arguments about
educational environments 57 than on more traditional
59
58
decreasing stigma or increasing academic achievement.
Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335 (2000) (examining application of
constitutional principles to schools).
53. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ("No question is raised
concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise,
and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of a proper age
attend some school .... ). Proponents of public education began crafting the legal and policy
structures for universal schools in the nineteenth century. IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET
WEIR, SCHOOLING FOR ALL: CLASS, RACE, AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

(1985). Every state in the nation legally requires school attendance, and provides for free
public education. MARK YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY & THE LAW 1 (2002).
54. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 782.
55. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
56. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-78 (1979);
San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 29-30; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
57. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2007-08) (arguing that Kennedy's novel claims about
racial equality in Parents Involved may be explained by Kennedy's belief in the important
function of educational institutions and may be limited to the constitutional domain of
education). See also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995).
58. The characterization of school integration as an effort to decrease racial stigma has
its roots in the social science evidence proffered in Brown, which has been criticized by
academic commentators See, e.g., Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of Segregation
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (suggesting segregation's purpose was clear, and
thus litigators need not have introduced such evidence to prove its harm). See also Missouri
v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121-22 (1995) (Thomas, J.,concurring) ("Given that desegregation
has not produced the predicted leaps forward in black educational achievement, there is no
reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of
their own race as when they are in an integrated environment.").
59. Early evidence showed only modest academic gains as measured by test scores.
See, e.g., NANCY HOYT ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975).

However, more recent research confirms significant academic benefits from desegregated
educational environments. See generally Roslyn A. Michelson, Twenty-First Century Social
Science Research on School Diversity and EducationalOutcomes, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1173
(2008); National Academy of Education, Race-ConsciousPoliciesfor Assigning Students to
Schools: Social Science Research and the Supreme Court Cases (2007),
http://www.naeducation.org/MeredithReport.pdf.
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While Kennedy does not refer to empirical evidence in his opinion, his
rationale closely mirrors the robust body of more contemporary social science
research that finds considerable long-term social benefits from racially
integrated schools. 60 Indeed, Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by three other
justices, explicitly references such evidence. 6 1 Scholars and jurists have
focused on these democractic and citizenship benefits, as well as the
educational benefits of integrated education, as some of the strongest reasons
for pursuing integration in the twenty-first century. 62 In highlighting the need to
alleviate the scourge of de facto racial segregation and trumpeting the
democratic benefits of racially integrated educational environments, this
language bridges the "jurisprudence of fragmentation" that has historically
63
plagued this area of the law.
In addition to the robust body of empirical evidence supporting racial
integration in education, evidence also highlights the political will to engage in
such policies. 6 4 Prior to the ruling, there were at least 1000 school districts
employing some form of voluntary racial integration plans. 65 After twenty-six
years of court-ordered desegregation, Jefferson County, Kentucky's school
board voluntarily continued its racial integration policy to maintain the benefits
60. See also James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 131, 132, 142-43 (2007) ("The defense of integration has always been on surer
footing when one also considers its social benefits-the ways in which integration can break
down or prevent stereotypes and prejudice, lead to long-term relationships across racial and
ethnic boundaries, and increase the possibility that students will continue to seek out
integrated colleges, workplaces, and neighborhoods."); Erica Frankenberg, Introduction:
School Integration-The Time is Now, in LESSONS ININTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE
OF RACIAL DIVERSITY INAMERICAN SCHOOLS 13-16 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield, eds.,
2007). See generally AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., BOTH SIDES Now: THE STORY OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION'S GRADUATES (2009).

61. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 837-43 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) "[T]his
Court from Swann to Grutterhas treated these civic effects as an important virtue of racially
diverse education." Id. at 841.
62. Id. A focus on the democracy benefits of racially integrated education also allows
for the acknowledgement that alternative avenues for increasing academic achievement may
be used in tandem with integrative efforts. For example, in those regions in which
demographic factors make achieving racial integration more prohibitive, scholars have
argued school choice initiatives such as charter schools and voucher programs may be better
alternatives for increasing academic achievement. For an interesting discussion, see the
Century Foundation and the Center for American Progress, School TurnaroundStrategies: A
Debate (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.centuryinstitute.org/list.asp?type=EV&pubid=264.
63. Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321 (2008) (arguing, inter alia, that school
desegregation cases based on "corrective justice" have a different jurisprudential grounding
than affirmative action admissions decisions in higher education that address the benefits of
diversity).
64. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 837-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing empirical
evidence for the support of race-conscious educational policies).
65. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., COMMON CORE DATA,
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY, 2004-05 (2007).
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66
that flowed from highly integrated schools. In that county, a majority of
67
parents had been in favor of the voluntary racial integration plan. On a
national level, some of those students who benefited most from the most
aggressive and progressive public school desegregation policies of the
the democratic and civic importance of
twentieth century have also highlighted
68
a racially inclusive education.
In outlining the compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation in
Justice Kennedy evinces an awareness and recognition that we must
education,' 69
"expound
the Constitution to accommodate current manifestations of
fundamental inequality: "our tradition is to go beyond present achievements,
however significant, and to recognize and confront the flaws and injustices that
remain." 70 Kennedy, with the implicit endorsement of the four dissenting
justices, has outlined a constitutional definition of equality in educational
opportunity that is more flexible and realistic than prior notions of equal
protection. Again, while it is unclear whether the Court will adhere to such a
definition in future jurisprudence, Kennedy's language is noteworthy for the
broader constitutional values it sets forth-values that have particular
normative significance when considering their application in the legislative
sphere.

B. Limitations of Current Jurisprudential Remedies for Racial Inequality in
Educational Opportunity
To advance the constitutional ideal that Justice Kennedy articulates with
force and eloquence in Parents Involved, the goal must be to find a workable
solution. The vexing reality is that the current Court is unlikely to give the ideal
practical strength when faced with continuing civil rights violations. This
dilemma results directly from existing jurisprudential limitations in remediating

66. For an in-depth analysis of the benefits of the Jefferson County, Kentucky
integration policy, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Integration Reconstructed, I DUKE J.L. &
SOC. CHG. 19 (2009).
67. In a 2000 survey by the University of Kentucky, sixty-seven percent of parents said
they believed that a school's enrollment should reflect the overall racial diversity of the
school district. Sam Dillon, Schools' Efforts Hinge on Justices'Rulingin Cases on Race and
Assignments,

School

N.Y.

TIMES,

Jun.

24,

2006,

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E7DB 1630F937A 15755COA9609C8B6
3.
68.

See generally AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., BOTH SIDES Now: THE STORY OF

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION'S GRADUATES (2009) (study showing that blacks, whites, and
Latinos who graduated from racially diverse schools in 1980 felt that desegregation better

prepared them for life in a global society, were disheartened by lack of continued
governmental efforts toward racial diversity, and were eager to replicate their racially
integrated educational experiences for their children).
69. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) ("[I]t is a constitution we are
expounding.").

70. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Oct. 2011]

EQUALITY DISSONANCE

twenty-first century structural, racial, and educational disparities. While Justice
Kennedy voiced a clear admonition of the persistent resegregation in public
schools and the need for policies to address the violation, a majority of Justices
failed to uphold the well-intended efforts of the school districts to racially
integrate their student bodies. Instead, a majority of Justices held that the
policies lacked the narrow tailoring necessary to survive a strict scrutiny
analysis. In evaluating the Jefferson County plan, Kennedy noted that the
"County fail[ed] to make clear to this Court ... whether in fact it relie[d] on
racial classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the interest in question,
rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and ad hoc manner that a less
forgiving reading of the record would suggest. ' 71 While Kennedy found the
Seattle school district had more clearly defined methods and criteria for its
student assignment plan, he eschewed the binary categories Seattle used to
racially classify students.72
Justice Kennedy's frustration with the Seattle and Jefferson County
integration policies highlights the judiciary's institutional limitations in
adequately addressing present-day manifestations of racial inequality in
educational opportunities. At the aspirational level, Kennedy offers an analysis
that more closely resembles an anti-subordination model of equal protection.
Yet, ultimately, Kennedy limits his suggested constitutional tools by steering
the final analysis closer to an anti-classification model. The blunt force of
Kennedy's narrow tailoring analysis ultimately saturates his idealism. Current
equality jurisprudence cabins analysis to the basic line of questioning required
under strict scrutiny without allowing for a depth or breadth of inquiry and
evidence that would permit more flexible policies. The overarching questionwhether the policies at issue are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest-limits the investigation. Such an examination is
insufficient to elicit the kind of widespread results necessary to fully address
persistent racial isolation in educational institutions.
An elaboration of the Court's articulation of the policies' shortcomings
illustrates this point. First, even Justice Kennedy acknowledges that narrow
tailoring analysis requires the Court to understand the scope and availability of
less restrictive alternatives. 73 Such an inquiry also requires "in many cases a
thorough understanding of how a plan works. 74 According to Kennedy, the
Jefferson County Board of Education failed to meet this mandate.75 One might

71. Id. at 786.

72. Id. ("It has failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with

fewer than half of the students classified as 'white,'

it has employed the crude racial

categories of 'white' and 'non-white' as the basis for its assignment decisions.").
73. Id. at 784.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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question, however, whether the judiciary has the institutional capacity to
thoroughly understand whether and how alternative policies might be used.
Second, both the Seattle and Jefferson County integration policies used
binary racial classifications.76 While this may be more understandable in
Jefferson County, where the student population is largely composed of African
78
American and white students, 77 Seattle has a diverse number of races. Justice
Kennedy seems deeply disturbed that the policy forces Seattle school children
to be categorized in such a fashion. The Court does not consider the merits of
policies that might allow for more nuanced racial classifications, or discuss
plans that might be alternatives to the Seattle plan.
This lack of inquiry into alternative policies is, obviously, a result of the
strict scrutiny analysis that places the burden of proof on the state actors. 79 Yet,
the policies' dismissal and the Court's limited inquiry into feasible alternatives
highlight a limitation of the adjudicatory model. 8° If the desired goal is
fostering racial inclusion to increase educational opportunity, then the inquiry
should include some analysis as to whether and how promising plans may
operate. There is substantial empirical evidence to support the use of race81
conscious policies, which the Court has in other instances acknowledged.
Litigants in Parents Involved provided substantial empirical evidence to
support the use of race-conscious policies in schools, but Kennedy neither
acknowledged the literature nor incorporated it into his analysis. 82 Litigants
83
necessarily limited the proffered empirical evidence to the cases at hand. A

76. Id at 723. ("[P]lans here employ only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race
exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and black/'other' terms in Jefferson County.")
77. McFarland v. Jefferson Cnty. Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (2004) ("The
racial profile of students subject to the 2001 Plan [was] about 34 percent Black and 66
percent White.").
78. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 786.
79. Id

at 783.

80. In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court discussed the incompetence of the judiciary to

tackle such issues: "The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for
the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in constitutional
adjudication. Courts, therefore, will overturn a legislative determination of a factual question
only if the legislature's finding is so clearly wrong that it may be characterized as 'arbitrary,'
'irrational,' or 'unreasonable."' 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
81. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
82. But see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 838-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
empirical evidence for the support of race-conscious educational policies).
83. The American Educational Research Association filed an amicus brief, which
documented the wide range of studies showing the benefits of racially diverse schools, as
well as the harms associated with racial isolation and the resegregation of previously
desegregated school systems. Brief for American Educational Research Association as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05908 & 05-915). Shortly after the Parents Involved decision, the National Academy of
Education produced a meta-analysis. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION, RACE-CONSCIOUS
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non-adjudicatory context may allow for the consideration and use of
information on precise methods or permutations of race-conscious policies that
have proven beneficial in other circumstances.
Kennedy attempts to do so, but he proffers solutions that move away from
any individual racial classification so as to avoid the rigidity of a strict scrutiny
analysis. 84 Kennedy suggests that districts are "free to devise race-conscious
measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each
student in a different fashion based solely on the basis of a systematic,
individual typing by race. ' 85 Instead, his constitutional tools either focus on
race-neutral means or generalized race-conscious policies, 86 which he argues
may not trigger a strict scrutiny analysis. 87 It may be, however, that a
combination of the two in conjunction with individual racial classifications
would be most beneficial without being unduly burdensome. This analysis
shows that an adjudicatory model, limited to the facts at hand, is less likely to
take note of the breadth of instances in which flexible race-conscious policies
can be and have been employed that are not as "ambiguous" as the plan
employed by the Jefferson County School District or as "binary" as the one
employed by the Seattle School District.
In contrast, as Justice Kennedy notes with approval, legislative and
executive branches have considered such flexible race-conscious policies for
years to address systemic racial inequality in education. Indeed, these bodies
may be best suited to continue to examine these thorny issues and facilitate
solutions for the future. While Kennedy may have envisioned a specific
emphasis on local political bodies addressing these issues, there may be even

POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE
SUPREME COURT CASES (2007), available at http://www.naeducation.org/lMeredith_

Report.pdf Drafted by an ideologically diverse group of renowned scholars, the analysis
found that desegregated schools offer short- and long-term benefits. In the short term,
racially desegregated schools are likely to improve inter-group relations, and in the long

term, they increase the likelihood of greater tolerance and better intergroup relations among
adults of different racial groups. Id. at 2.
84. ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("These mechanisms
are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells
each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand
strict scrutiny to be found permissible.").
85. Id. at 706.
86. As noted earlier, Justice Kennedy has exhibited a disdain for individual racial
classifications in prior jurisprudence. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389. But see Ian Ayres, Don't
Ask Don't Tell: Narrow TailoringAfter Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEx. L. REV. 517, 521 (2007)
(arguing the race-conscious law school admissions policy upheld in Grutter had a greater
racial preference than the policy struck down in Gratz v. Bollinger).
87. Kennedy notes that "[t]hese mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to
different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined
by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible."
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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greater opportunity for Congress to play a strong role in facilitating such work
on the ground.

III. LEGISLATIVE OPPORTUNITIES TO BRIDGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVIDE
A. Popular Constitutionalism
Any court-articulated vision of the substantive equality right of racially
integrated education raises the question of how to connect the ideal to workable
solutions. Ultimately, the juricentric model88 remains ineffective at mapping
out the most appropriate and effective constitutional remedies. Existing
jurisprudential remedies, while helpful to some, cannot be the panacea for
systemic and entrenched racial inequality.
Throughout history, the federal branches of government have engaged in a
dialogue about the shape and contours of constitutional protections that has
allowed our nation to bridge the gap between constitutional ideals and practice.
As scholars Reva Siegel and Robert Post have stated, these struggles over
89

law.
constitutional meaning have shaped the very content of our constitutional
The evolution of rights for African Americans and other racial minorities in the
United States is the product of an often tense political/judicial dialogue rooted
deep in the fabric of our Constitution9" that extends to current debates on the
most prudent ways to make real the promise of ensuring "equal protection"
under the law. The constitutional guarantee set forth in Brown remains elusive
in part because of the widening chasm between our constitutional ideals and
adjudicated constitutional law, 91 as evidenced by recent Supreme Court

88. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power: PolicentricInterpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J.
1943 (2003) (distinguishing between juricentric and policentric constitutional interpretation).
89. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 27 (Reva B. Siegel & Jack Balkin, eds., 2009) . There is

voluminous scholarly literature on the dialogue. See also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 373,
376 (2007) (suggesting democratic constitutionalism "describes how our constitutional order
actually negotiates the tension between the rule of law and self-governance"). See also NEAL
DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC

CONSTITUTION

(2004); LOUIS

FISHER,

CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

(2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
90. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1
(migration and importation clause); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 cl. 3 (fugitive slave clause).
91. See Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudenceof the Legislated Constitution,in THE
CONSTITUTION IN2020, at 25 (Reva B. Siegel and& Jack Balkin, eds., 2009) (highlighting the
difference in the concepts of "adjudicated," or court-interpreted, and legislated constitutional
law, arguing that the legislated Constitution is more in line with progressive goals).
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decisions regarding the inability or impropriety of adjudicated constitutional
92
law to ameliorate persistent racial inequities.
The variance is especially apparent in the pervasive nature of racial
inequality in educational opportunity. While Brown issued a mandate to
eliminate racial segregation in public education, the type of racial
resegregation 93 occurring in public elementary and secondary schools today
takes on a different form. But, it is no less pernicious than the constitutional
violation identified nearly sixty years ago. Indeed, many American schools
have "apartheid" levels of racial segregation, 94 yet the segregation is not easily
traceable to a state mandate. Adjudicated constitutional law addressing racial
segregation in public education has been ill-equipped to identify and address
these current manifestations of racial inequality in public education. Rather,
existing jurisprudential remedies redress state-mandated racial inequalities, and
they are a feeble tonic in the face of twenty-first century systemic racial
inequities.
On a foundational level, it is the populist branch of our national
government that may be an appropriate place to renew the country's
commitment to racial inclusion. As other scholars have suggested, the national
legislature affords several crucial components that neither the judiciary nor
executive branches of federal government possess.95 First, by its very scope, the
national legislature provides more weight and authority to the causes it
champions than any other political body. Second, political debate and the
legislative process mandate an unparalleled level of political accountability.
Third, the legislative process requires significant involvement from a variety of
advocates on many different levels. The process also allows greater flexibility
than the judiciary in fashioning narrowly tailored remedies. Finally, Congress
has the critical ability to enforce its policies. Given its unique position in our
national landscape, it is no wonder that scholars have long argued its essential
96
role in constitutional interpretations of civil rights norms.

92. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The ContradictionBetween Equal Protection'sMeaning
and its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 533 (2006) (discussing the Court's inability to provide clear definition on meaning of

equal protection).
93. See., e.g., SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? (John Charles
Boger & Gary Orfield, eds., 2006); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACIAL
TRANSFORMATION

AND

THE CHANGING NATURE

OF SEGREGATION

(2006) available at

http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k- 12-education/integration-and-diversity/racial-

transfonrmation-and-the-changing-nature-of-segregation/orfield-racial-transformation2006.pdf; JONATHAN KozOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA, (2005).

94. Id. at 9.
95. See generally REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY:
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006).

CONGRESS,

THE

96. See, e.g., West, supra note 91; William N. Eskridge, Jr., America's Statutory

Constitution, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 44 (2007) (contending that democratic institutions
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In the face of persistent resegregation of the nation's public schools, our
national legislature may be a particularly appropriate institution to facilitate the
creation and maintenance of holistic measures to improve educational
opportunity structures. Rather than foreclosing possibilities for race-conscious
policies, a majority of justices seem to invite the development of carefully
tailored legislative policy in this arena. 97 Justice Kennedy confirms legislative
and executive power and acumen to address constitutional violations and
structure practical remedies. 98 Such a conception of equal protection
jurisprudence allows political bodies to address de facto racial isolation "with
candor and with confidence" that the Constitution supports their laudable
efforts. 99 The Court has implicitly recognized the distinctive role that political
where courts are not
branches play in protecting equality values in areas 100
prepared to handle them without congressional guidance.
B. Existing Models
Given the jurisprudential trajectory away from addressing critical racial
inequalities in educational opportunity, it is an apt time to consider the existing
models of regulatory movement for equality at the intersection of race and
education and how these may inform efforts to craft innovative models
addressing twenty-first century disparities. Indeed, there is a long history of the
federal political branches drafting and enforcing strong civil rights protections
when jurisprudential remedies proved limited.' 0 ' While one traditionally views
educational policy as a function of state and local governments, with schools
receiving a majority of their funding from these bodies,' 0 2 Congress has played

require "stability," "adaptability," and "legitimation," which can be achieved through
congressional and administrative deliberation).
97. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also
id. at 822 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

98. Id. at 791-92.
99. Id. at 837. While it is likely that Justice Kennedy may have envisioned local school
boards, rather than the national legislature, when making the comment, I argue that his
message is just as salient when one views the role of Congress.
100. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: CongressionalPower to Extend
and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1 (2007) (examining how recent
changes in legal doctrine have impacted congressional authority to protect voting rights).
101. Legislative developments outside of the intersection of racial discrimination and
education include the 1982 and 2007 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) (extending some provisions of the Act for an additional twenty-five
years), the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006_
(expanding the Education for All Handicapped Children Act), and the bipartisan passage of
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which responded
to jurisprudence that weakened employment discrimination protections, Pub. L. No. 100259, 102 Stat. 796 (1987).
102.

BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., Is SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? 2 (2010).
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a pivotal role in shaping school desegregation policy for more than half a
century.
As scholars have opined,' 0 3 the decade following Brown'0 4 offers a stark
example of the power of federal legislation to spur reform. In Brown's
immediate aftermath, districts lacked such a broad base of support and a
legislative structure to realize the desegregation mandate. Local districts that
wanted to eliminate segregation lacked any tools or roadmap for doing so, and
were weak in the face of staunch political opposition. Prior to the passage of
national legislation, the vast majority of African American students in southern
states still attended fully segregated schools. 10 5 Yet, Congress played a pivotal
role in changing the tide of racially segregated public education. These efforts
took the form of race-conscious legislation such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
the 1972 Emergency School Aid Act, the 1974 Equal Educational
Opportunities Act, and the Magnet Schools Assistance Program, as well as
"race-neutral" legislation like the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education
10 6
Act and its most recent iteration, the No Child Left Behind Act.
With President Lyndon Johnson's vigorous support, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 provided some of the most effective tools for dismantling racial apartheid
in American public schools. Title VI prohibits racial discrimination by any
entity receiving federal funds, and permits the denial of federal funds to any
educational institution engaging in racial segregation. The Department of
Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) continues to hold this enforcement
power and set guidelines requiring schools to desegregate. In addition, the Civil
Rights Act authorizes the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division to
initiate litigation if such compliance efforts are unsuccessful.
While at the time of the Civil Rights Act's passage most public school
funding came from state and local governments, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) increased the power of the potential loss of
federal funds. ESEA provided funds for remedial aid to schools with a
disproportionate amount of low-income students. Since the Deep South was
one of the poorest regions of the nation, much of this funding was ear-marked
for those states that had resisted desegregation efforts. To receive funds,
103. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004); Mark
Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693 (2004).

104. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 537 (1954).
105. Ninety-eight percent of Southern black children attended segregated schools in
1964. GARY ORFIELD AND JOHN T. YUN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 12 (1999).
106. See No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
20 U.S.C. § § 6301, et seq.); 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-l; Magnet
Schools Assistance Program, Pub. L. No. 98-377, Title VII, 98 Stat. 1267 (1984); 1974
Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2006); 1965 Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965); 1972 Emergency School
Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1601-19 (1972) (repealed 1978).
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schools had to comply with Title VI. In addition, the Emergency School Aid
Act of 1972 (ESAA) offered funding to help eradicate segregation and racial
discrimination in elementary and secondary schools. Congress enacted the
ESAA in 1972, agreeing that "racially integrated education improves the
'07
The ESAA passed with bipartisan
quality of education for all children."'
support, as well as the support of President Richard Nixon. Due in part to such
efforts, the percentage of black students in majority white schools rose from
two to thirty-three percent between 1964 and 1970.108 Although such efforts
were later constrained by an amendment that limited federal funding for
busing, 10 9 Congress continued to enact legislation aimed at reducing racial
isolation in public education.
Some legislative developments have emphasized choice as a means of
reducing racial isolation in schools and identifying existing structural racial
inequality in the provision of public education. In the 1980s, for example,
Congress passed the Magnet Schools Assistance Program to provide assistance
to school districts implementing magnet schools. The goal was to "meet the
special needs incident to the elimination of minority group segregation and
discrimination among students and faculty in elementary and secondary schools
[and] to encourage the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention of
minority group isolation in elementary and secondary schools with substantial
proportions of minority students."" 0 In reauthorizing the program in 1994,
Congress explicitly found that the federal government should support those
districts seeking to "foster meaningful interaction among students of different
racial and ethnic backgrounds," particularly at the earliest educational levels."'
By the late 1980s, forty-four percent of black students attended majority white
schools.11 2 In updating the Magnet Schools Assistance Program, Congress has
affirmed that it is in the best interests of the nation to continue federal support
of both court-ordered desegregation plans, and those voluntarily implemented
meaningful interaction among racially and
by local school boards to maximize
113
students.
diverse
ethnically

107. H.R. REP. No. 92-576, at 3 (1971). Congress recognized that "education in an
integrated environment, in which [all] children are exposed to diverse backgrounds, is
beneficial." S. REP. No. 92-61, at 7 (1971).
108. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 12 at 23.
109. The Eagleton-Biden Amendment of 1977, part of Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat.
146D (1977). See STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF

TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 157 (1995).
110. Pub. L. No. 98-377, Title VII, 98 Stat. 1267, 1299 (1984).
111. Pub. L. 103-382, Title V, § 5101, 108 Stat. 3518, 3691 (1994) (amended 2002).
112. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL
SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 37 (2003).
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WITH
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113. 20 U.S.C. § 7231(a)(4)(A), (C) ("It is in the best interests of the United States ...
to continue the Federal Government's support of local educational agencies that are
implementing court-ordered desegregation plans and local educational agencies that are

voluntarily seeking to foster meaningful interaction among students of different racial and
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The most recent reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act is the much-debated No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), 14
which represented the federal government's largest foray into educational
policy at its passage. It signaled a momentous change in the balance of power
between the states and the federal government in shaping the scope and
direction of public education, and it has been the subject of controversy for its
imposition of federal mandates on states and its reliance on tests. 115 Among
other provisions, NCLB allows for the transfer of students from "lowperforming schools" to those that are higher performing within their district. In
addition, the Act requires that results of annual statewide testing be published
and disaggregated at every level by race and ethnicity. Yet, it does not hold
state agencies accountable to schools for resources, and is not funded by the
federal government.
C. Lessons for the Twenty-First Century
Historic civil rights legislation has addressed some of the deficits in
jurisprudential remedies for racial inclusion in education and facilitated more
forceful desegregative measures. These forms of legislation have provided
critical tools to ameliorate the scourge of racial discrimination in public
education since the time of the Brown ruling. Yet, much historic legislation
enacted at the intersection of race and education has focused on eliminating
racial disparities in education caused by an identifiable perpetrator of
discrimination.11 6 Present manifestations of systemic racial inequality and
isolation in elementary and secondary schools may require innovative
legislative approaches to equality not focused on eliminating specific instances
of de jure discrimination. As Justice Kennedy's concurrence eloquently noted,
today's racial disparities in educational opportunity are not so easily traced to a
specific instance of harm by a state actor.
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, is a necessary tool to
address instances of racial discrimination in public education, but remains

ethnic backgrounds; and ... to continue to desegregate and diversify schools..."). Congress
stated that the express purpose of the updated provisions was to assist in the desegregation of
schools by providing funding to local school authorities for "the elimination, reduction, or
prevention of minority group isolation in elementary schools and secondary schools." 20
U.S.C. § 7231(b)(1).
114. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301, et seq.
115. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left
BehindAct and the Post-CivilRights DesegregationEra, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1703, 1725-30
(2003).
116. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (describing Act's goal of "closing the achievement gap
between high-and low-achieving children, especially the achievement gaps between minority
and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged
peers").
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focused on identifying harm caused by a state actor. In addition, recent anticlassification frameworks of equality jurisprudence have hampered the reach of
enforceability under Title VI, limiting opportunities for redress to an
administrative complaint process rather than also allowing for a private right of
action.' 1 7 As such, while Title VI is one important instrument to address
persistent racial inequities in education, there is an opportunity to look at ways
in which existing regulations may be enhanced by innovations that specifically
respond to twenty-first century systemic inequities.
At this juncture, Congress may provide some solutions to the disconnect
between the existing anti-classification framework and the anti-subordination
ideal by enacting legislation to facilitate innovative responses by localities to
these twenty-first century equal protection violations. Existing models of socalled choice legislation, such as the Magnet Schools Assistance Program, have
offered interesting provisions for facilitating racial inclusion in public
education. To be sure, such programs are most effective when coupled with
sufficient funding, an understanding of current racial demographics, and an
acknowledgement of the complexities of persistent racial segregation and
disparities in education. This includes an emphasis on supporting voluntary
measures to reduce racial isolation, and furthering diversity beyond the
"binary" categorizations eschewed by the Court in ParentsInvolved.

In fact, models of choice legislation may be most effective when coupled
with mechanisms that facilitate the information gathering and data sharing
features of other "race-neutral" legislation like the No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB). At a minimum, the information gathering and data-sharing aspects of
recent federal legislation like NCLB provide an opportunity for using evidence
of racial disparities in educational attainment to craft policy that speaks to some
of the demographic, social, economic, and racial differences in existing
While some scholars and advocates have argued
educational environments.
that NCLB is problematic due to a misplaced reliance on sanctions to promote
educational reform, 119 the transparency of such provisions allows for a fuller
understanding of some of the persistent inequities in educational opportunity
and attainment.
At present, public education in the United States is extremely
decentralized, as nearly 16,000 school districts develop policies through their

117. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (eliminating a private right of
action to sue for racial discrimination in education under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act).
118. See, e.g., Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and
Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act's Race-ConsciousAccountability, 47 How. L.J. 243,
295-96 (2004).
119.

See generally HOLDING NCLB ACCOUNTABLE:

EQUITY, AND SCHOOL REFORM

ACHIEVING ACCOUNTABILITY,

(Gail Sunderman, ed., 2008); HEINRICH

MINTROP ET AL., WHY

HIGH STAKES ACCOUNTABILITY SOUNDS GOOD BUT DOESN'T WORK-AND WHY WE KEEP
DOING IT ANYWAY (2009).
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own departments.
They lack the resources to determine the forms of racially
inclusive policies that will work best. 21 The national legislature is a logical
body to focus these efforts because there is a benefit of scale. By soliciting
input from a variety of actors and gathering data at a national level, the
legislative process serves an educational and heuristic function. National
information gathering and data sharing help illuminate the optimal means of
achieving integrated learning in a variety of demographic contexts. In addition,
the large scale collection and dissemination of social science research on
benefits of various voluntary integration policies and normative stories may
encourage other districts to do better in their efforts to provide quality
education for all students.
Recent legislation and congressional appropriations support this
conclusion. In 2009, Congress appropriated $2.5 million to the Department of
Education to distribute through competitive grants to school districts seeking
122
technical assistance in designing or implementing student assignment plans.
Through these methods, congressional action may provide the means to secure
the constitutional entitlement to racially inclusive education. Such
congressional action can provide structure and support to local government
actors currently attempting to further the constitutional mandate, and provide
the force of law to persuade others to follow suit.
While current legislation offers some hopeful tools to help dismantle
deeply entrenched structures of racial inequality, such tools are most effective
when coupled with enforcement mechanisms and accountability measures. The
potential for creating regulatory structures that include strong enforcement
mechanisms and accountability measures depends on a number of factors,
including the potential for collaboration with the Executive Branch. 123 In
addition, the potential for truly substantial legislative innovations may be
through an examination of the scope of legislative power to enact new
enforcement legislation at the intersection of race and education. Theoretically,

120. BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? 2 (2010).

121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000c-2, 2000c-5. The Technical Assistance for Student
Assignment Plans Program assists in "preparing, adopting, or modifying, and implementing
student assignment plans to avoid racial isolation and resegregation . . . and to facilitate
student diversity ..
" U.S. Department of Education, Technical Assistance Support for
Student Assignment Plans Program, availableat http://www2.ed.gov/programs/tasap/
index.html. School districts "use these grant funds to seek assistance and expertise from
student assignment specialists, demographers, community relations specialists, facility and
other planners, or curriculum specialists and . . . specialists and consultants from academia,
non-profit organizations, civil rights organizations, and the private sector." Id.
122. See Technical Assistance Support Program, USDOE.
123. See generally Epperson, Undercover Power, supra note 19. See also U.S.
Department of Education, New Technical Assistance Center Offers Magnet Schools
Opportunities to Grow and Connect (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.ed.gov/oiinews/new-technica-assistance-center-ffers-magnet-schools-opportunities-grow-andconnect.
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power to enact such legislation may derive from the Congress's power under
the Commerce or Spending Clauses or under the Reconstruction Amendments.
In future work, I explore the scope of congressional enforcement power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation that may
24
specifically address continuing racial isolation in education.1 Ultimately, such
provisions depend on the political will of the national legislature to identify and
acknowledge structures that discourage racial equality in education and create
mechanisms to foster innovations by local legislative bodies to address
disparities and foster educational opportunity.
CONCLUSION

The crossroads of educational crises and jurisprudential limitations suggest
the time has come for an examination of potential legislative opportunities to
facilitate equal protection guarantees in the context of racial equality and
education. While recent jurisprudence has complicated the equality terrain with
respect to public education, the political branches play an important role in
shaping the contours of the Constitution's equality guarantee. Congressional
power in this realm is, at its core, a mechanism for ensuring that the promise of
equality is realized for all. One hopeful and substantive path for addressing
hyper-segregation in American schools and its attendant inequities may be to
capitalize on congressional power to remedy twenty-first century structural ills.
As a co-equal branch of the federal government, Congress plays an important
institutional role in fleshing out the shape and meaning of the constitutional
remedy associated with the basic constitutional guarantee to racial equality in
the opportunity to learn.
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